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JULES LEQUYER AND THE OPENNESS OF GOD 
Donald Wayne Viney 
Until recently the most prominent defender of the openness of God was 
Charles Hartshorne. Evangelical thinkers are now defending similar ideas 
while being careful to distance themselves from the less orthodox dimensions 
of process theology. An overlooked figure in the debate is Jules Lequyer. 
Although process thinkers have praised Lequyer as anticipating their views, he 
may be closer in spirit to the evangelicals because of the foundational nature of 
his Catholicism. Lequyer's passionate defense of freedom conceived as a cre-
ative act as well as the theological implications he drew from this are examined 
for their relevance to the present discussion of the openness of God. 
Jules Lequyer (1814-1862) is a philosopher whose name is little known 
outside his native Brittany.! Reasons for his obscurity are not difficult to 
find. He published nothing during his lifetime; his writings are mostly 
incomplete or fragmentary; his work was not widely available until 
1924, and his CEuvres did not appear until 1952; translations of his writ-
ings have either been in the form of excerpts or printed in little known 
publications.' The neglect of Lequyer's work is unfortunate, for he was 
a gifted writer and an ingenious and resourceful thinker. Charles 
Renouvier, his close friend, referred to Lequyer as his "master in philos-
ophy" and William James called Lequyer "a French philosopher of 
genius."3 The most well-known contemporary philosopher who rou-
tinely recognizes Lequyer's contributions is Charles Hartshorne. 
Lequyer's primary contributions to philosophy are his reflections on 
the meaning and ramifications of human freedom. One finds evidence 
of Lequyer's influence on James. In France, the first to take notice of 
Lequyer, after Renouvier, were the Existentialists. Jean Wahl and others 
noted parallels between the philosophies of Lequyer and Kierkegaard. 
Finally, process philosophers, who can be credited with transmitting 
Lequyer to an English speaking audience, have remarked on the ele-
ments of process philosophy in Lequyer's thinking.4 
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Lequyer's philoso-
phy can be tapped for its relevance to what Richard Rice and Clark 
Pinnock call the openness of God. According to this idea, God is quali-
fied by temporal processes, even to the extent of facing a future whose 
details are not settled in advance. In the words of William Hasker, "God 
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is a risk-taker."5 Lequyer was a devout Catholic, even a mystic, who 
was aware of the implications of his philosophy of freedom for theology. 
An enduring aspect of Lequyer's genius is to have written literary mas-
terpieces in which the idea of the openness of God is developed in 
detail. 
The Openness of God 
Before turning to Lequyer's philosophy it will be useful to have a 
more definite idea of what the phrase "openness of God" means. The 
openness of God is defined in contrast to those aspects of the classical 
concept of God that deny God's relativity to temporal processes. 
According to classical theism, God is wholly simple (without parts), 
wholly eternal (no temporal aspects), wholly immutable (without 
change), and wholly impassible (devoid of emotion or passion). Of 
course, classical theism held other doctrines about God, but this cluster 
of concepts is that against which the openness of God is contrasted. 
Here is Rice's summary of the concept of the openness of God: 
The central claim of this alternate view is that God's experience 
of the world is open rather than closed. God's experience does 
not consist of one timeless intuition. He does not have one eter-
nal perception of all reality, past and future. Instead, He 
responds to developments and changes in the world as they 
occur. Accordingly, God is open to new experiences and 
receives new stimuli. He continuously assimilates new data. 
God does not have once and for all the entire value of the crea-
turely world. He acquires the value of creaturely events as they 
happen, as they come into existence.6 
In contrast to classical theism, the open view of God claims that God is, 
in certain respects, not simple, not eternal, not immutable, and not 
impassible. 
Pivotal to the doctrine of the openness of God, if not to its intelligibili-
ty, is that the classical ideas about God are not completely mistaken. 
There are respects in which God is simple, eternal, immutable, and 
impassible. For example, Rice maintains that the existence and character 
of God should be considered beyond time and change. To remain true 
to the Biblical witness, not only must one conceive of God's existence as 
unchanging, but the divine faithfulness, righteousness, justice, and 
mercy must also be understood as unchanging. More recently, Hasker 
makes the same point, albeit in the context of "perfect being theology." 
According to Hasker, 
God changes-not indeed in his essential nature, his love and 
wisdom and power and faithfulness, but in his thoughts and 
deeds toward us and the rest of his creation, matching his 
thought toward the creature with the creature's actual state at 
the time God thinks of ie 
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Thus, the idea of the openness of God is not that God is not simple, eter-
nal, immutable, and impassible; it is that God is not wholly simple, eter-
nal, immutable, and impassible. 
A principal reason for believing in the openness of God derives from 
the belief in human freedom. According to Pinnock, Rice, John Sanders, 
Hasker, and David Basinger, 
God, in grace, grants humans significant freedom to cooperate 
with or work against God's will for their lives, and he enters 
into dynamic, give-and-take relationships with us.8 
When these authors refer to "significant freedom" they mean more than 
acting voluntarily. They mean freedom as conceived by incompati-
bilists. In Hasker's words, 
an agent is free with respect to a given action at a given time if 
at that time it is within the agent's power to perform the action 
and also in the agent's power to refrain from the action.9 
This sort of freedom involves genuine contingency, and according to the 
doctrine of the openness of God, human decisions may not turn out as 
God wants-hence the idea of God as a risk-taker. It is this sort of free-
dom that God's grace grants to the creatures, at least to the human 
ones. 10 
A momentous consequence of the idea of the openness of God, drawn 
by the evangelicals we have mentioned, is that God knows the future as 
relatively indeterminate so far as human free decisions are concerned. If 
a person, in making a free decision, faces an open future, a being with 
perfect knowledge would know this. Classical theists conceived God's 
knowledge (whether as eternal or as perfect foreknowledge) as a detailed 
map of all that occurs, past, present, and future. For the classical theist, 
the appearance of a relatively indeterminate future is merely a function 
of a limited point of view. From a divine standpoint, there is no uncer-
tainty; God's knowledge is a crystal ball revealing all that will be. 
Lequyer on Freedom and its Theological Implications 
Lequyer adhered to the idea of the openness of God and, like the con-
temporary exponents of this idea, he emphasized human freedom. His 
concept of freedom is multifaceted and includes a profound sensitivity 
to the many dimensions of our lives in which we are not free. 
Furthermore, his ruminations on how freedom is known are insightful 
and novelY However, for our purposes it is enough to make two points. 
First, Lequyer affirmed an incompatibilist idea of freedom. "If it is a 
question of a free action," he says, "we know that it is really possible not 
to do it." Second, he identified this sort of freedom with creativity. In 
deciding among alternatives, in a genuinely free decision, we are the 
originators of new "modes of being." "To act," says Lequyer, "is to 
begin," that is to say, to initiate a "train of events." For good reason Jean 
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Grenier said that Lequyer's philosophy "is nothing but a serious medita-
tion on the word create."!2 
Lequyer did not hesitate to draw out what he believed to be the theo-
logical implications of the concept of freedom as creativity. He did not 
seriously question the truth of his faith. He believed that the existence of 
God could not be demonstrated and he questioned the value of theistic 
proofs as confirmations of faith. Nevertheless, Lequyer's interpretation of 
the doctrines of his faith, drawn from his concept of freedom, place him 
in direct and conscious defiance of the regnant Catholic tradition. 
The self-creative creature. If God is the creator, and if freedom is cre-
ativity, then God creates beings capable of creating. It is as much a state-
ment of the logic of his position as a declaration of his faith that Lequyer 
speaks of "God who created me creator of myself." 13 The alternative 
view, which dominated Catholicism in particular and Christianity gen-
erally, is neatly stated by Thomas Aquinas. 
[To] create can be the proper action of God alone. For the more 
universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and 
prior causes. Now among all effects the more universal is being 
itself; and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most 
universal cause, God. 
For Aquinas, any being that God creates participates in the nature of 
being. Thus, its activity always presupposes being. At most "it causes 
being in some particular subject."!4 For example, Aquinas says that man 
is the cause, through procreation, of human nature in the child. 
Updating Aquinas' biology one would say that the parents are the cause 
of human nature in the child. The parents are not, however, the cause of 
human nature itself. 
Lequyer would not disagree with the specific example Aquinas uses. 
However, he denies that a creature can only cause being in some particu-
lar subject. Freedom involves an "absolute initiative" that brings some-
thing into being that, prior to the decision, was a mere potentiality. The 
free act is itself drawn from nonbeing and adds, by its activity, a new 
determination to beingY Aquinas presupposes the very thing that 
Lequyer rejects, namely, that effects can be reduced to their causes. 
Lequyer argues that one does not find within God the reason or the 
cause for the creature's free activity. The decisions of the creatures bring 
something into existence-if only the decisions themselves-for which 
God is not responsible. Lequyer asks, "if God creates us at each instant 
such as we are, how are our actions really free and indeterminate?"!'; 
Only a compatibilist concept of freedom, which Aquinas accepts but 
which Lequyer rejects as inadequate, would save the creature's freedom. 
The difference between Lequyer and Aquinas is profound for it involves 
not only the concept of freedom, but also the concept of omnipotence. 
Lequyer marvels at the power to create a being capable of acts of creation. 
Without a doubt, nothing was difficult for God: God is power 
itself. But to create a being who was independent of himself, in 
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the rigorous sense of the term, a really free being, a person, what 
an undertaking! All his art is brought to bear on the task, and 
one does not know what feat of strength it takes to achieve the 
masterpiece. 
By creating a self-creative creature God opens the prospects both for 
greater goods and greater evils, for the creatures may choose evil over 
good or a lesser good over a greater good. God has created a being 
"who can will what God does not want, and not will what God wants, 
that is to say, a new God who can offend the other."!7 Lequyer conceives 
God to have a power that Aquinas denies of God, that is to say, the 
power to create beings independent of the divine being. 
Potentiality in God. Perhaps Lequyer's most radical departure from 
traditional theology is his claim that creaturely decisions have an 
effect upon God. If Lequyer is correct then, contrary to classical theism, 
God is not wholly simple, eternal, immutable, and impassible. Here 
Lequyer is in agreement with the doctrine of the openness of God. 
Aquinas provides the locus classicus of traditional theism. He argued 
that God is pure act, with no admixture of potency. It follows that there 
can be no change in God since potency is the principle whereby things 
change. If there can be no change in God then God cannot be qualified 
by time-God is not only immutable but eternal. Furthermore, God's 
eternity is not a question of everlasting existence but of genuine time-
lessness. Another consequence is that God, as the fullness of being itself, 
is in no way affected by creaturely decisions. Aquinas says that "the 
creatures are really related to God," because God is their creator, howev-
er, "in God there is no real relation to the creatures ... " since the crea-
tures can have no power over God.!S 
Lequyer's insistence on freedom as creativity will allow him to accept 
very little of this traditional idea of God. If the creature is itself creative, 
another god beside God, then its decisions must have an effect on God. 
Targeting the doctrine of Aquinas, Lequyer says, "The relation of God to 
the creature is as real as the relation of the creature to God."!9 
By conceiving God as creating creatures who are themselves capable 
of creating, Lequyer introduces a principle of potency into the divine 
being. He argues, 
The sovereign intelligence would not confuse [the world] with 
nothingness and, small as it is, it suffices to deprive God of the 
integrity of all encompassing being. It makes a spot in the 
absolute that destroys the absolute. This universe compared to 
immensity is, I concede, but a grain of sand; but this grain of 
sand has its proper being, and the changes that are brought in it, 
not having less reality than the things that change, God who 
sees these things change changes also in regarding them, or he 
does not perceive them change. 
Lequyer's argument for divine potentiality is simple, but it turns on the 
premise that God creates other creators. A creator brings something new 
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into existence. God, being perfectly aware of what exists, must be aware 
of these new realities being brought into existence by the lesser creators. 
What is brought into existence is brought into existence in time; hence, 
God is qualified by temporal processes. This is what Lequyer means 
when he says that there is a "spot on the absolute that destroys the 
absolute." The absolute that is destroyed is the wholly immutable God 
of classical theism. Cognizant of the profound departure from tradition-
al thought Lequyer writes, "Terrible prodigy: man deliberates and God 
waits."20 
God's Knowledge. Lequyer draws a further theological consequence 
from his philosophy of creative freedom that meets with even greater 
resistance from traditional theology than the claim that there is a princi-
ple of potency in God. According to Lequyer, God cannot know eternal-
ly or beforehand what a free creature will do; God has "conjectural" 
knowledge of future free decisions. 
It is instructive to note that the denial of eternal foreknowledge in 
God does not follow directly from the affirmation that there is a princi-
ple of potency in God. If God were nontemporal but internally related to 
the world, then God's knowledge of the world could be fully actualized 
but it would still make sense to say that God's knowledge could have 
been otherwise. This view requires something like Boethius' view that 
temporal events can be present to God "simultaneously" without com-
ing to exist for God successively. Boethius argued that, in a strict sense, 
an eternal God does not have foreknowledge; that is to say, God's cogni-
tive act of knowing does not precede the event it knows. 
Lequyer denies the Boethian doctrine. He says with irony, "to be 
wholly present eternally, in spite of its very fugitive existence is the 
proper character of a finite being."21 Lequyer notes that this view of eter-
nal knowledge implies that God knows things as they are present to the 
divine mind (in eternity), not as they are in themselves (in time). In sim-
plest terms, a wholly eternal God would know that things occur in time 
but would never know what time it is. The feeling of time's movement 
must be, from a Boethian perspective, illusory. 
Lequyer is also clear that his own view does not entail that God is not 
omniscient. Aquinas argued convincingly that the inability of God to 
accomplish the logically impossible is no limit on God's power; it is only 
a limit on what it makes sense to say God can do. For instance, God can-
not make a rectilinear figure that, in the same respect, is both a circle and 
a square, for a square-circle is not a possible object. Lequyer proposes an 
analogous argument for omniscience. If a future event exists as an unre-
alized possibility and not as an actuality, then it is no limit on God's 
knowledge not to know the event as actua}.22 
Clearly, Lequyer does not believe he is committed to the claim that 
God is ignorant of something. Hartshorne puts the case succinctly: 
The point is not that God is first ignorant and then knowing, but 
rather that first there is no definite fact of the kind to know and 
then there is the fact ... "knowing all truth" is entirely compatible 
with "acquiring new truths" as new realities come into being.23 
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The issue, then, is not whether God is omniscient, but what sort of 
things exist for God to know. If the future is relatively indeterminate 
where free acts are concerned, then a perfect knower would know it as 
such. Leguyer says that God knows the past as past, the present as pre-
sent, and the future as future. The difference between divine and nondi-
vine awareness of real possibilities is that the latter is "limited, obscure 
and full of errors, whereas God knows them perfectly."24 
Leguyer takes the argument a step further by saying that his view of 
omniscience recognizes a knowledge in God that the classical view does 
not, to wit, a knowledge of unsettled possibilities. He says to the classi-
cal theologian: 
I do not deny in the least the knowledge of God, which is mani-
festly infinite. But if you will allow me to say it, it is you, mas-
ter, who does not take into consideration a reality that I affirm, 
namely that God knows that some man is at present undecided 
between two choices, and that neither the one nor the other is 
absolutely future, but that each of the two is conditionally, 
imperfectly future. 25 
The master-the classical theologian-could respond that, on his view, 
God is aware that some man is undecided between two choices. 
However, what the master cannot concede is that, from God's point of 
view-which is the true point of view-the man's future is indetermi-
nate. Thus, according to classical theology, the man's future is as fully 
determinate as his past, although the man, in making his decision, can-
not act as though it is fully determinate. 
Lequyer's reflections bring us face to face with the question of the 
nature of time. Many classical theologians, following Boethius, said that 
God's relation to the temporal world is analogous to the relation of a cir-
cle to its center. Just as all of the points on the circumference are 
equidistant from the center, so each moment of time is present to God.26 
Duns Scotus rejected this analogy on the grounds that "time is not a 
standing circumference but a flowing one."27 Lequyer too rejects the cir-
cle analogy. He insists that a careful analysis of the movement from 
potentiality to actuality-from the may be to the is-shows it to be essen-
tially temporal. 
The existence of a thing at an instant and at the same time the 
possibility, not anterior, but concomitant, that this thing not exist 
at the same instant that it exists and is not able not to exist inso-
far as it exists-this escapes me altogether.28 
Leguyer uses an analogy. The shadow of the bird perched on a limb 
does not remain after the bird flies away. Similarly, act and potency, 
with respect to a single event, do not coexist. 
Questioning the Doctors 
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The theological implications that Lequyer draws from his philosophy 
of freedom aptly demonstrate what he says of himself, to wit, that the 
"reasoning of the doctors have never had any power over me"29 
Lequyer's most extended treatment of the teachings of the "doctors" is 
"The Dialogue of the Predestinate and the Reprobate." The dialogue 
takes one into the heart of Lequyer's reflections on the relations between 
divine power, divine knowledge, and human freedom. Renouvier called 
the dialogue "a dramatic metaphysical masterpiece, probably without 
equal in any literature." Hartshorne and Reese echo this judgment.3o 
This high praise is founded on the imaginativeness, passion, humor, and 
tight argument with which Lequyer approaches the problems, as well as 
the ingenuity of Lequyer's own solutions. Although the dialogue 
remains unfinished it provides a well-rounded view of Lequyer's ideas 
on the subject of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. 
The dialogue is divided into three parts. In the first part, two clerics 
are made privy, by means of a screen, to God's knowledge of their 
futures. One of the monks, who is simple and pious, has lived his life in 
devotion to God. He sees in the vision that he shall succumb to a fault, 
backslide, and be damned to hell. He is called "The Reprobate." The 
other monk, whose piety is questionable, sees in the vision that he shall 
one day repent of his sins and become a resident of heaven. He is called 
"The Predestinate." The Predestinate takes it upon himself to give hope 
to his friend by trying to convince him that his friend's damnation, 
"though certain, will perhaps not happen."31 The consolation comes in 
the form of various distinctions, culled from medieval and renaissance 
philosophers, that attempt to reconcile human freedom and Providence. 
The Reprobate remains unconvinced, and unconsoled, as the first part of 
the dialogue ends. 
A further ironic twist occurs as the second part of the dialogue begins. 
In essence, the second part is a dialogue within a dialogue. The 
Predestinate points to an episode twenty years in the future that is 
revealed on the screen of God's knowledge. The screen shows that the 
Reprobate will become someone called "the master" who defends the 
very ideas that he has just rejected from the mouth of the Predestinate. 
The master monitors a Socratic exchange between a young divine 
named Probus and a youth, Caliste, who aspires to be one of the mas-
ter's pupils. Probus now serves as Lequyer's mouthpiece. He convinces 
Caliste that truths about future contingents must be expressed in the lan-
guage of probabilities. Moreover, probabilities are to be understood not 
merely as a function of our ignorance of the outcomes of events, but may 
sometimes express a real indeterminacy in the events themselves, as in 
the case of free acts. It is Probus who argues that truths about future 
contingents are not settled in advance and hence, that God could no 
more know the future as though it had already taken place than God 
could give all of the properties of a circle to a square. 
The closing segments of the second part of the dialogue are given over 
to a discussion between Probus and the master. The master claims that 
Probus' views are merely a repetition of Aristotle's ideas about future 
contingents (which, interestingly, the master finds acceptable). However, 
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the master doubts that Probus' views can meet the test of orthodoxy, for 
it would seem that God would be unable to issue absolute prophecies 
about the future. Probus defends his views against this objection but the 
master is given the final word. The master appeals to the mystery of God 
and accuses Probus of relying too heavily on the imagination in his 
claims about what God can and cannot do. According to the master, God 
is aware-without contradiction-of future free acts as indeterminate in 
relation to us and as determinate in relation to himself. 
The third part of the dialogue, which is the briefest, gives voice to the 
Reprobate's anguish and his inability to accept the classical idea of 
divine foreknowledge. Lequyer employs ironic similes to ridicule the 
idea of God that the Predestinate has been defending. The dialogue 
ends with the two clerics returning to "the dream of human life."32 
Neither has a specific memory of the mutual vision they have had. This 
memory loss is essential to the coherence of the dialogue, otherwise, the 
Reprobate could use his knowledge of the future to avoid the damnation 
which is certain to be his. Satan, who was not privy to the vision, is 
given the final ironic word. "Let us work," he says, "and perhaps one or 
the other will reimburse me for my trouble."33 Of course, this is precise-
ly what has been revealed in the vision. 
The Mechanics of Omniscience 
Lequyer's main concern in the dialogue is with what I and others call 
the mechanics of omniscience.34 That is to say, how is it that God comes to 
have knowledge, what is the source of divine knowing? Let us call this 
the source question." The source question should be kept distinct from 
two other questions about God's knowledge. First, can God's knowledge 
of one's future free acts be reconciled with the claim that those acts are 
genuinely free? Let us call this the reconciliation question. Second, assum-
ing that God has knowledge of truths about what occurs in time, 
how are those truths-especially ones concerning future contingents-
to be understood? Let us call this the semantic question. Although 
Lequyer's discussion touches on all of these questions, it is clear that he 
views the source question as the most fundamental. 
The reconciliation question. Consider first the reconcilation question. 
Let A be a person's decision which has yet to occur, that is to say, which 
is in the future. The question of reconciliation is whether the following 
sentence, labeled R, is true or false: 
R. If God knows A then A is not free. 
The Predestinate gives a standard response to this question by distin-
guishing the necessity of consequence and necessity properly so-called. The 
necessity of consequence is necessity as it applies to a sentence; necessity 
properly so-called is necessity as it applies to A, the event itself. The two 
senses of necessity can be written as follows-using NC and NP as the 
names of sentences expressing necessity of consequence and necessity 
properly so-called respectively: 
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NC. Necessarily, "If God knows A then A will occur." 
NP. If God knows A then A's occurring is necessary. 
221 
The necessity expressed in NC applies to the quoted sentence. It is 
arguable that NC makes explicit what it means to know something. In 
that case, NC is a special case of the more general truth: Necessarily, "if 
K knows A then A will occur," where K is any knower. However, NC 
neither states nor entails that God's knowledge of A is necessary or that 
A itself is necessary; the necessity qualifies the conditional as a whole. 
Thus, it is impossible, using only NC, in conjunction with the statement 
that God knows A, to deduce that A is not free. In other words, the fol-
lowing argument is invalid: 
Necessarily, "If God knows A then A will occur." 
GodknowsA. 
Therefore, A's occurring is necessary. 
The only conclusion that one may derive from these premises is that A 
will occur, not that A's occurring is necessary. 
In order to correctly infer that A is not free one requires the much 
stronger statement of NP, in which the necessity of A itself is a conse-
quence of God's knowing it. However, NP appears to be false. In other 
words, the following argument, though it is valid, appears to be 
unsound: 
If God knows A then A's occurring is necessary. 
God knows A. 
Therefore, A's occurring is necessary. 
Why should something be necessary merely because God knows it? Put 
another way, why can't God have knowledge of contingencies, includ-
ing future ones? 
The source question. Can God have knowledge of future contingencies? 
The argument thus far does not decide the issue. Nothing we have said 
warrants a definite answer to whether R-"If God knows A then A is not 
free" -is true or false. However, R might be true if the source of God's 
knowledge is incompatible with A being free. For this reason the 
Reprobate is dissatisfied with the Predestinate's appeal to the two sorts 
of necessity. He suspects that there is an "antecedent necessity" upon 
which God's knowledge is based which deprives him of his freedom.36 
In short, the Reprobate is asking the source question. 
The source question may be asked by adding a qualification to R, call 
it X, which will stand for any explanation for how God comes to have 
knowledge of A. Let us call the new sentence S: 
S. If God knows A because of X then A is not free. 
Since X is a variable ranging over various explanations of God's cogni-
tive state of knowing A, S will be true or false depending on whether X 
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is compatible or incompatible with A's being free. It is important to note 
that X must be an explanation for God's cognitive state of knowing A. In 
other words, it is not enough to say that God knows A because God is 
omniscient. The "because" in S is not the "because" of definition but the 
"because" of explanation. 
Alfred Freddoso argues that the commitment of traditional Christian 
thinkers to the doctrine of God's providential control of the world pre-
vented them from conceiving the reconciliation question simply as a 
matter of showing human freedom and mere precognition to be compat-
ible.37 Christians not only believe that God has perfect knowledge of the 
world, they also believe that God arranges the world perfectly in accor-
dance with the divine plan. Moreover, if God is to have control of the 
world, then God's knowledge of the world cannot occur, as it were, by 
accident. Ordinarily it is taken as an article of faith by Christians that 
God is infallibly omniscient; that is to say, God believes all and only true 
propositions in any world in which God exists. However, being infalli-
bly omniscient may be a necessary condition of being God, but it is not 
sufficient. An infallibly omniscient being who had no other divine prop-
erty would hardly qualify as God. Lequyer agrees with these points, and 
he too is concerned to provide a robust doctrine of divine providence. 
The problem for the Christian thinker, of course, is to save God's 
providential control of the world without denying human freedom, 
which, as Lequyer argues, is the basis of morality and human dignity. 
Alternately, the Christian must save human freedom without denying 
God's providence. In Lequyer's attempt to address this problem, three 
interrelated questions appear and reappear in the dialogue. 
(1) Who or what brings it about that a particular free decision is 
made? 
(2) Is a choice between two or more alternatives such that, given 
the identical antecedent conditions for the choice, the choice that 
was made is not the only choice that could have been made? 
(3) Does God know something because it happens or does it 
happen because God knows it? 
The answer to the first question, as far as Lequyer is concerned, is that it 
is the agent himself or herself who is responsible for the free decision. In 
the opening stages of the dialogue, the Predestinate correctly identifies 
the source of the Reprobate's despair. He despairs because he believes 
that his salvation no longer depends on himself.38 Lequyer is also clear 
about the answer to the second question-freedom requires an open 
future. 
Lequyer is no less clear about the answer to the third question. 
Indeed, he is disarmingly straightforward. Lequyer maintains that God 
knows what happens because it happens, it does not happen because 
God knows it. Here at last is Lequyer's answer to the source question. 
His account, based on an analogy with human perception, would seem 
to be the simplest account of the mechanics of omniscience. The knowl-
edge relation in God is in principle no different than it is for the crea-
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tures. Moreover, Lequyer's account clearly preserves the freedom of the 
creatures. Indeed, this is Lequyer's reason for adopting it. 
Unfortunately, there are at least three problems with the simple 
explanation of God's knowledge, as far as traditional theism is con-
cerned. First, it requires that the divine life is qualified by temporal 
processes. A related concern was that God, to be God, must be in all 
respects immutable, that is to say, unchangeable. But if the occurrences 
in the world bring about a change in God's cognitive states, in God's 
knowledge, then God cannot be immutable in all respects. Finally, the 
claim that God knows things because they happen poses a problem for 
divine providence. How can a God who must, so to speak, wait on the 
world's events to occur before knowing them be in control of those 
events? 
In order to vouchsafe the perfection of God, most traditional theolo-
gians argued that God is eternal and completely immutable. These ideas, 
coupled with the idea that God's will is efficacious in creation, provided 
a strong basis for divine providence. However, the thrust of Lequyer's 
argument is that the only accounts of the mechanics of omniscience-of 
answers to the source question-that are consistent with this concept of 
God also jeopardize the freedom of the creatures. Consider Aquinas. In 
keeping with his denial that there is any real relation in God to the crea-
tures, he maintained that things occur because God knows them. It is 
true that Aquinas often used perceptual metaphors for God's knowledge 
suggesting that God knows things occur because they occur. However, 
he explicity says, "the knowledge of God is the cause of all things. For 
the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the arti-
ficer is to the things made by his art."39 
In the dialogue, Lequyer explores Aquinas' theory as it occurs in the 
writings of the Thomistic scholar Jacques Bossuet. The Reprobate con-
cedes that Aquinas' views give prescience "a solid basis." On the other 
hand, Aquinas' view violates Lequyer's requirement that a free action is 
an action brought about by the one whose decision it is. Late in the first 
part of the dialogue the Reprobate says to the Predestinate: 
You have to understand that passing from the vulgar notion of 
God Almighty to the scientific notion of God All-Doing is hard 
work for me. I was so accustomed to thinking that God does not 
do everything since man does something!40 
The irony in the Reprobate's statement is vintage Lequyer. Aquinas' 
"scientific" notion of "God All-Doing" destroys human freedom. 
An account of the mechanics of omniscience that Lequyer does not 
discuss directly, either in the dialogue or elsewhere in his writing, but 
which has received a great deal of attention in recent years is Luis de 
Molina's theory of middle knowledge. Molina attributed three sorts of 
knowledge to God: (I) natural knowledge: knowledge of all possible 
objects-along with their necessary relations-to which divine power 
extends; (II) free knowledge: knowledge of the objects that have been actu-
alized by the divine will; and (III) middle knowledge: knowledge of what 
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any free creature would do under any set of circumstances.41 The sort of 
freedom that Molina attributes to the creatures is the libertarian freedom 
accepted by Lequyer. Moreover, a middle knowledge proposition is not 
a statement about what a free creature is likely to do in a given situation, 
but simply a statement of what the free creature would in fact do. If God 
has middle knowledge of what a possible free creature would do under 
any set of circumstances and also places the creature in those circum-
stances, God knows infallibly what the creature will freely do. Molina's 
theory is designed with the traditional restrictions in mind. That is to 
say, Molina's God is eternal and wholly immutable. Furthermore, God's 
providential control of the world is not in doubt. 
The closest that Lequyer comes in the dialogue to discussing middle 
knowledge is in the Predestinate's use of Bossuet's arguments. The 
Predestinate quotes Bossuet directly: "God makes us such as we would 
be ourselves if we were able to be of ourselves ... "42 Bossuet's view is 
that God creates us in such a way that we make the decisions we would 
make if we had libertarian freedom. This presupposes that God has mid-
dle knowledge, knowledge of what any free creature would do. The dif-
ference between Bossuet and Molina is that in Bossuet's theory God uses 
middle knowledge to know what decisions to bring about in the crea-
tures, whereas in Molina's system God uses middle knowledge to know 
what decisions the creatures will bring about by themselves. Bossuet's 
theory denies Lequyer's first requirement whereas Molina's view appar-
ently preserves it. 
Lequyer rejects Bossuet's idea as incoherent. He has the Reprobate 
ask rhetorically, "Does God bring it about that we do precisely what we 
would do if we did inconceivable things that we would do if the absurd 
were realized?"43 The required condition of existing apart from God is an 
impossibility. Thus, it would be impossible for God to create us such as 
we would be if we could exist apart from God. The impossibility would 
also infect God's knowledge. God could not have knowledge of an 
impossibility. 
It is difficult to imagine that Lequyer would be any less dissatisfied 
with Molina's solution than he was with Bossuet's. It is true that Molina, 
like Lequyer, denies that God brings about the creature's decisions. 
However, unlike Lequyer, Molina does not believe that the truths of 
propositions about what a free creature would do are brought about by 
the creature. God is said to have middle knowledge prior to the crea-
ture's existence. Indeed, for Molina, God has middle knowledge of a 
myriad of possible creatures who are never born. Nor are these truths 
brought about by God; Molina says that "middle knowledge is indeed in 
God before any free act of His will ... "41 Clearly, the truth about what 
the free creature would do is determined by neither God nor the creature. 
If Molina concedes that the truth of a proposition about what a free 
creature would do is not determined by the creature, he may insist never-
theless that the truth of a proposition about what a creature will do is 
determined by the creature. In this way Molina could meet Lequyer's 
requirement that the agent him or herself is responsible for the decision 
in question. Can Molina also meet Lequyer's requirement for a free deci-
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sion that the agent could have chosen otherwise? Molina believed so, 
but it is difficult to see how. 
To say that a free decision could have been otherwise is plausibly 
construed as the idea that there are antithetical but equally possible 
worlds in which an agent makes contrary decisions in the self-same cir-
cumstances. The possibility in question must be more than mere logical 
consistency, for it must be possible for the agent, by his or her decision, 
to bring either possible world into being, to make it actual. Suppose an 
agent (5) in a given circumstance (C) makes a decision (A). Let us call 
this possible world number 1, symbolized PW1. 
PW 1: 5 is in C and chooses A. 
By hypothesis, PWI is the actual world. Now consider a second possi-
ble world, PW2, which is such that, up to and including 5' s being in C, 
PW2 is identical to PW1. What distinguishes PW2 and PWI is that 5 
chooses not-A in PW2. Hence, PW2 is defined as follows: 
PW 2: 5 is in C and chooses not-A. 
If 5' s decision for or against A is to be free in the sense accepted by both 
Lequyer and Molina, then both PWI and PW2 must be possible. That is to 
say, while PWI is the actual world, PW2 could have been the actual 
world. 
It is a fair question whether Molina's principles permit these condi-
tions. Molina's God knows that PWI is the actual world because God 
created 5 in C and because God has middle knowledge-God knows 
that if 5 were in C, 5 would choose A. This same middle knowledge, 
however, prevents God from creating (and hence, knowing as actual) 
PW2. God's knowledge of PW2 is restricted to God's natural knowledge. 
That is to say, God knows that there is 110 logical impossibility involved in 
asserting that 5 is in C and that 5 chooses not-A. Thus, PW2 is indeed a 
possible world but not in any sense that would preserve 5' s freedom. 
Given God's middle knowledge and his decision to place 5 in C, PWI is 
the only world that is really possible. 
Prophecy and Providence. For all of the difficulties that Thomistic and 
Molinistic accounts of the mechanics of omniscience pose for human 
freedom, they have the advantage of providing a basis for absolute 
prophecy and for a robust doctrine of divine providence. Aquinas' God 
has providential control of the world because he is the primary cause of 
all that happens. Molina's God can control which world becomes actual 
by consulting his middle knowledge. A serious problem with Lequyer's 
God, so far as the classical theologians are concerned, is that he may be 
surprised or even thwarted in his plans by the caprice of human free-
dom. How can a God who must wait upon human decisions to know 
what they are going to be issue absolute prophecies or guide history in a 
providential way? 
Lequyer takes these questions quite seriously if only because he had 
no desire to contradict his church's doctrines. This alone is enough to 
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show that Lequyer has as much or more in common with the evangelical 
defenders of the openness of God than with Hartshorne's process theol-
ogy. Unlike the evangelical philosophers, Hartshorne is not interested 
in defending the idea of Biblical prophecy. In the dialogue, the master 
challenges Probus to explain how his view of God can avoid these prob-
lems. "Let us see," he says, "if with all your evasions you will evade 
God." The master specifically mentions Jesus' forecast that Peter would 
deny him and his prediction that Judas would betray him.4s If Lequyer 
is correct in denying that God knows free decisions in advance then how 
would such absolute prophecies be possible? 
The outline of Lequyer's response to these criticisms is evident from 
the discussion of the dialogue. Unfortunately there is a major lacuna in 
the text so that we do not have Lequyer's fully developed answer to the 
criticisms. Nevertheless, Lequyer left clues, in the form of notes and cita-
tions scribbled in the margins, as to the direction his thought was 
taking.46 Combining these notes with the arguments that are developed 
in the dialogue one can piece together Lequyer's ideas about prophecy 
and providence. 
Three strands of thought are woven together in Lequyer's theory. 
First, if one takes prophecy seriously, one must account for both 
absolute prophecies and conditional prophecies. A conditional prophecy 
is a prediction of what will (or will not) occur depending on how 
humans respond to God's commands. Lequyer-through Probus-men-
tions the example of God sparing the Ninevites after they heeded 
Jonah's warnings. The citations found in Lequyer's marginal notes indi-
cate that he had carefully examined the Bible and found other examples 
of conditional prophecies. The importance of conditional prophecies is 
that they presuppose human freedom. God punishes or rewards 
depending upon how the individuals to whom the prophecy is 
addressed freely respond to the warning. Lequyer seems to be position-
ing himself to argue that classical accounts of the mechanics of omni-
science, because they compromise human freedom, undermine condi-
tional prophecies. 
Promising though this line of reasoning is, it remains undeveloped in 
the dialogue. Instead, Lequyer focuses upon the idea that God knows in 
unerring detail the necessary consequences of decisions that, in their ori-
gins, are contingent. These consequences, Lequyer argues, are the 
objects of absolute prophecies. For example, he says that Judas' betrayal 
was already consummated in his heart when Jesus said "One of you will 
betray me."47 
Lequyer insists that we are prone to considering human decisions in 
isolation from the context in which they are made. We fail to appreciate, 
in Lequyer's metaphor, the shadow that the present casts upon the 
future. 48 However, every decision has its effects and we are often not 
aware of what these effects will be, for the smallest of decisions can have 
the greatest effects. 
What do we know of that which is open or of that which is 
closed for us in the future for each of our acts, and I speak even 
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of the least of them? No more than I know if this movement of 
my hand transmits a movement, and what movement, to the 
extremities of Asia. How our own being escapes us, especially as 
it expands more and more!" 
However, God has perfect knowledge of the consequences of human 
decisions and can therefore issue prophecies that, from a human per-
spective, predict the future in surprising detail. 
Lequyer presses the argument further by observing that God must 
know the extent to which we have shaped our own characters by the 
decisions we have made. Lequyer says that we should admire the man 
who, because he has developed a good character, is above temptation 
more than we admire the man who must exert a mighty effort to over-
come the effects of his own poorly developed character.5o In any particu-
lar case, God knows what is and what is not within one's power to do. A 
lifetime of bad habits, for example, can make further unwise decisions 
inevitable. 
The final strand of Lequyer's reasoning is to remind us that God, as 
well as humans, has a hand in the fulfillment of prophecies. By acting, or 
refusing to act in certain ways, God may guarantee the fulfillment of an 
absolute prophecy. This is how Lequyer interprets the prophecy of 
Peter's denial. Peter proclaims that he would not desert Jesus in his hour 
of need. But Jesus saw into Peter's heart and realized that there was 
more pride than faith in his declaration of loyalty. On this basis, Jesus 
predicted that Peter would deny him. Lequyer asks, "so that Peter infal-
libly fall into this predicted fault, [did it not suffice] that at the moment 
of peril God refused to rescue him?"5l In Lequyer's view, Peter's denials 
were the inevitable result of Peter's character and God's withholding of 
divine aid at the critical moment. 
Lequyer's emphasis on the extent of God's foreknowledge of the con-
sequences of free decisions, coupled with his reminder of God's active 
role in fulfilling absolute prophecies, are the primary elements whereby 
he attempted to retain an orthodox doctrine of providence. Lequyer's 
intentions were clear. According to Grenier, Lequyer was "greatly scan-
dalized" by an argument for the incompatibility of providence and free 
will that he read in Bergier's Dictionnaire de ThCologie. 52 Lequyer quoted 
Bergier as maintaining that, if humans have free will, 
God would continually be obliged to change his decrees and 
form completely contrary ones, because he would encounter 
obstacles that he would not have foreseen. 
Lequyer scornfully refers to this argument as "the foolish words of 
Bergier."53 Apparently he meant more than that it is foolish to conceive 
of an overextended deity; Lequyer believed it is foolish to suppose that 
human freedom entails that God would continually have to revise his 
plans in light of unforeseen contingencies. 
Lequyer does not develop his theory of providence any further in the 
dialogue. However, he gives the question of providence an imaginative 
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twist in Abel and Abel, a work he called a 'biblical narrative." Abel and 
Abel are identical twins who are tested as to their responses to God arbi-
trarily favoring one over the other. Lequyer imagines three possible out-
comes to the test. In the first, the chosen Abel is puffed up with pride 
while his brother is jealous and angry. In the second, the chosen Abel 
refuses his election out of concern for his brother. In the third, the Abel 
who was not chosen rejoices in his brother's good fortune. Whatever the 
outcome, the brothers discover that God's favor is based upon their 
responses to the test. Lequyer says that the "Book of God" is a stone 
engraved thus: "Your name is: What you were in the test."S4 Only in 
the last two scenarios are the Abels triumphant and their destinies 
secured. Xavier Tilliette summarizes the parable this way: "One is not 
born predestined, or damned, one becomes it."55 
According to one of Lequyer's close friends, Abel and Abel was his 
"most beloved work."56 Thus one is tempted to interpret the dialogue in 
light of the parable. While the Predestinate and the Reprobate are not 
identical twins, their responses to the tableau of God's foreknowledge is 
closest to the responses of the Abels in the first scenario. The 
Predestinate can barely conceal his delight at his turn of fortune and the 
Reprobate is full of bitterness and jealousy. Be this as it may, the argu-
ments of the dialogue are not superseded in the parable.57 Something 
like the hypothesis of Probus must be true if the story of the Abels is to 
make sense. In other words, the future must be open, even for God, if 
the Abels are to have any hand in their own destinies. The only doctrine 
of providence compatible with this condition is one in which it is God's 
plan that the Abels decide their own fates. Thus, Abel and Abel does not 
shed additional light on how Lequyer proposed to keep the future open 
enough to accommodate free will but closed enough to insure divine 
providence. 
The semantic question. Lequyer's effort to develop an alternative to the 
classical concept of God's omniscience would be incomplete if he did 
not address the question of the truth value of statements pertaining to 
future contingents. We have already noted Lequyer's answer to the 
objection that his God is ignorant of the future. According to Lequyer, 
future contingents are not possible objects of divine cognition, and thus, 
it is no limit on God not to know them. God is perfectly aware, perfectly 
omniscient, of the extent to which the future is open. 
Lequyer's argument is clever but it does not prove that his God is not 
ignorant. Here is a simple counter-argument: An omniscient being is a 
being who knows the truth value of every statement. That is to say, for 
any statement, an omniscient being would know whether it is true or 
false. Consider the following two statements about a given future con-
tingent, A: 
A will occur. 
A will not occur. 
If these statements are contradictory, then one must be true and the 
other must be false. However, Lequyer's God does not know which of 
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these statements is true. Therefore, Lequyer's God cannot be omniscient. 
Lequyer's answer to this argument follows Aristotle's reasoning. He 
abandons the principle of excluded middle where future contingents are 
concerned. Bivalent logic recognizes only two truth values, true and 
false. In standard bivalent logic, the principle of excluded middle states 
that, for any proposition p, the schema "p or not-p" is true. 58 Lequyer 
argues that, where contingencies are concerned, excluded middle is true 
or false depending on the tense of p. 
Between contingent past things and contingent things to come 
there is this difference: Of two contradictory affirmations con-
cerning contingent past things, one is true, the other false; but of 
two contradictory affirmations concerning contingent things to 
come, neither the one nor the other is true, both are false.'" 
Suppose that A is a contingent event. Then, on Lequyer's view, the state-
ment, 
A occurred or A did not occur. 
is true since "A occurred" and "A did not occur" have opposite truth 
values-one is true and one is false. However, the statement, 
A will occur or A will not occur. 
is false since "A will occur" and "A will not occur" are both false. Since it 
is no problem to suppose that God would know these things, there 
would be no meaningful sense in which God is ignorant. 
Lequyer's semantics for future tense propositions represents a depar-
ture from traditional logic, although it should not, for this reason alone, 
be discounted. Lequyer is not the first or the last to suggest qualifica-
tions on the principle of excluded middle. Lequyer took the idea from 
Aristotle. In our day, excluded middle has been questioned on a number 
of independent fronts, from quantum mechanics to fuzzy 10gic. nO 
Nevertheless, denying the principle of excluded middle considerably 
complicates logical formalisms and has, in addition, certain counter-
intuitive consequences. For example, if "A occurred" is true, when 
uttered after the occurrence of A, then shouldn't "A will occur" be true 
when uttered before the occurrence of A? Thus, W. V. O. Quine advo-
cates that "predictions are true or false when uttered, no matter how ill-
founded and capricious."ol 
Lequyer acknowledges the counter-intuitive consequences of his view 
and suggests a number of ways to interpret ordinary language so as to 
avoid them."2 In any event, it is certain that Lequyer's view is not alone in 
being counter-intuitive. According to the traditional view, the following 
statements can both be true (when uttered before the occurrence of A). 
A will occur. 
A may not occur. 
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Lequyer would say that if the first statement is true the second must be 
false. Lequyer is in good company. Aristotle would agree. So would 
Charles Dickens who has Scrooge ask the Ghost of Christmas Yet to 
Come, "Are these the shadows of the things that Will be, or are they 
shadows of the things that May be, only?"63 These examples demonstrate 
that there is no consensus on how statements about future contingents 
are to be interpreted. As Hartshorne says, "People commonly hesitate, in 
this and many other matters, between two or more meanings ... . "04 
We will not here attempt to further adjudicate the debate between 
Lequyer and classical thinkers. However, it is worth noting that 
Hartshorne developed a semantics for future contingent statements that 
meets the spirit of Lequyer's theology without abandoning the principle 
of excluded middle. Hartshorne suggests that we conceive definiteness 
and indefiniteness as predicates for future moments of process. A future 
moment is definite or indefinite depending on whether causal conditions 
necessitate, exclude, or permit the moment in question. This allows one 
to put statements about the future into three categories, corresponding to 
the formally exhaustive triad, all/none/some. Either (a) all causal possi-
bilities include A (definitely A), (b) no causal possibilities include A (defi-
nitely not A), or (c) A is included in some but not all causal possibilities 
(indefinite with respect to A). As Hartshorne notes, this view does not 
require the sacrifice of the principle of excluded middle. "The truth of 
one of the three (a, b, or c) is the falsity of the other twO."65 
George Shields has shown how Hartshorne's semantics can be repre-
sented using a logical square of opposition similar to Aristotle's tradi-
tional square.66 
A will be A will not be 
Contraries 
Subcontraries 
A maybe A may not be 
Square of Opposition for Future Tense Propositions 
(following Hartshorne's semantics) 
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Lequyer calls U A will occur" and" A will not occur" contradictories and 
claims that, where A is a future contingent, both are false. Hartshorne's 
alternative is to identify the two propositions as contraries. By defini-
tion, contraries are such that both may be false. Hence, Hartshorne's 
semantics allows one to say, with Lequyer, that "A will occur" and "A 
will not occur" may both be false without thereby denying the principle 
of excluded middle. b7 Furthermore, Hartshorne's semantics agrees with 
Lequyer's view (and, interestingly, with Aquinas) that "To know things 
before they happen is to know them in their causes."68 
Lequyer' 5 Legacy 
Lequyer summarizes the case for his view of God eloquently, through 
the character of Probus: 
The All-Powerful, the divine poet, in no way brings about the 
appearance on the world scene of characters who come to fill a 
roll decided for them in advance-these imitations of life are the 
games of human genius. Who could make of the work of God so 
frivolous and so base an idea! God made man free and capable 
himself of resisting even him. When he acts on us, he has said, it 
is with a great respect.69 
The classical theologians, intent on insuring God's knowledge of the 
future, unwittingly destroyed the basis upon which a person's decisions 
can be called his or her own. Moreover, as Lequyer suggests at the close 
of the first part of the dialogue, the puppet master view of God also 
seems to make God responsible for the evil that occurs in the world. In 
fairness, one must say that the classical theologians believed that they 
could dodge this unwelcome consequence. Lequyer's theology, on the 
other hand, obviates the need for auxiliary explanations concerning the 
goodness of God. The problems of theodicy are bad enough without 
compounding them by making God the sale decision maker. 
Lequyer did not live long enough to complete his work. His life came 
to a tragic end when he drowned off the coast of Brittany. His was a 
spirit troubled by lost love confused with dreams of glory. Nevertheless, 
his writing provides glimpses of a resourceful and active mind. 
Moreover, he developed his ideas with great literary power and imagi-
nativeness. As Wahl said, Lequyer failed to achieve a fully developed 
system, but "not without leaving in the philosophical sky some brief 
vivid traces."70 
The "traces" examined in this paper demonstrate that he anticipated 
and expanded upon the idea of the openness of God. He forcefully 
articulated objections to the classical concept of God. Moreover, he 
clearly saw the problems that the open view of God must address to be a 
tenable option for Christian belief and he struggled to show how to meet 
the objections to it. With Lequyer's solution to the ancient problem of 
divine foreknowledge and human freedom is born not only a critique of 
traditional arguments but new ways of conceiving the divine life and its 
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relation to the flux of time. 
Unfortunately, very few contemporary discussions of philosophical 
theology examine Lequyer's writings, much less mention his name. 
Thus, more than a hundred years after his death, his legacy has yet to be 
determined. Somehow it is fitting, in light of his philosophy, that the 
future should be open even in this respect. 
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